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Abstract
We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time,
double auction markets with discrete goods and multiple qualities. When price con-
trols exist, the existence of competitive equilibria (the solution concept of classical
market theory) is no longer guaranteed; hence, we investigate the nature of non-price
competition and how markets might evolve in its presence. We develop a quality com-
petition model based on matching theory. Equilibria of the quality competition model
always exist in such price-constrained markets; moreover, they naturally correspond to
competitive equilibria when competitive equilibria exist. Additionally, we characterize
the set of equilibria of the quality competition model in the presence of price restric-
tions. In a series of experiments, we find that market outcomes closely conform to the
predictions of the model. In particular, price controls induce non-price competition
between agents both in theory and in the experimental environment; market behaviors
result in allocations close to the predictions of the model.
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1 Introduction
We investigate how price ceilings and floors affect outcomes in continuous time, double
auction markets in which both price and quality can vary. Price controls can prevent market
prices from adjusting to equalize supply and demand. Nevertheless, they are a pervasive
form of government regulation: rent control, the minimum wage, and price supports for
agricultural commodities are all common instances. Changes in product quality have been
suggested as a dynamic response to the inability of the market to equate supply and demand
by price changes.1 Indeed, a number of works support the possibility that price controls
induce quality competition in various regulated industries2, and other research investigates
how job characteristics such as the amount of employer-supplied training are affected by the
minimum wage.3 However, theoretical inquiry into this phenomenon has been frustrated by
the fact that competitive equilibria may fail to exist when price controls are imposed and
thus equilibrium models have not been available to study the phenomena.4
Due to the lack of a theoretical foundation, we conducted exploratory experiments fo-
cused on two basic questions. The first question was whether quality adjusts to enable
market clearing when price controls are imposed. This question was addressed within a
market environment in which multiple different qualities were produced and consumed. The
environment was studied with and without price controls. These experiments led to the
discovery of principles that explain the subtle patterns in the data; moreover, the principles
1Such an effect has been suggested by Feldstein (1973), Leffler (1982), and Hashimoto (1982), among
others.
2See Plott (1965) for an analysis of non-price competition by regulated dry cleaners,
Douglas and Miller III (1974) for an analysis of non-price competition by airlines, and Joskow (1980) for
an analysis of non-price competition by hospitals.
3See Hashimoto (1982) and Neumark and Wascher (2001).
4In general equilibrium theory (which assumes perfectly divisible goods), work by Dre´ze (1975) and
van der Laan (1980) showed the existence of l-equilibria for markets with price restrictions by showing
that there exists a set of ad hoc supply/demand constraints on agents such that, given these constraints,
there exists equilibrium prices. However, for markets with indivisible goods (such as those considered in
this work), competitive equilibria are only guaranteed to exist when agents’ preferences satisfy the gross
substitutes condition; see Gul and Stacchetti (1999). However, even when preferences satisfy the gross
substitutes condition, the existence of a competitive equilibrium can not be guaranteed when price controls
are imposed.
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Figure 1: The effect of a price floor when only one quality is present.
provide guidance even in settings when the classical market equilibrium does not exist. Our
findings suggest that the appropriate model is related to models found in the matching the-
ory literature. We develop this model and use it to make a number of predictions regarding
equilibrium behavior. Evaluating the resulting model required the design of a second set
of experiments that differed from the first in terms of the parameters of the environment,
number of discrete qualities available, and the shapes of the demand and supply curves. The
behavior of market participants in this second series of experiments resulted in allocations
and prices that were essentially indistinguishable from those suggested by the theory.
To understand the effect of price controls, consider Figure 1, which illustrates the classical
case of demand and supply. The Walrasian competitive equilibrium is the point (p, q). If a
price floor is imposed at pˆ, a competitive equilibrium no longer exists. Experimental work
has demonstrated that the prices will converge to pˆ and volume will be qˆ but suppliers want
to sell q¯ and that leads to an excess supply of q¯ − qˆ; this phenomenon was first studied by
Isaac and Plott (1981). The suppliers could profitably trade a greater number of goods at pˆ
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but buyers for that quantity do not exist.
In this work, we ask whether the competition generated by the excess supply would
support the emergence of better qualities, if such additional, higher quality products were
technically possible. Moreover, if such better quality products do emerge, what qualities
would they be and what would be their prices and volume?
The data from the first series of experiments led to the development of a theory to explain
market outcomes in settings where price controls are present. In this model, which we will call
“the quality competition model”, the classical notion of competitive equilibrium is replaced
by the notion of stability from cooperative game theory, which is closely related to the core
of an appropriately defined dominance relation. In the case of an economy without price
controls, a correspondence exists between the competitive equilibrium and stable outcomes,
a special case of the model developed here. However, even when competitive equilibria do
not exist, stable outcomes still exist in our setting.
A stable outcome is a set of transactions that is
1. Individually rational, i.e., no agent wishes to unilaterally withdraw from a transaction
to which he is currently committed, and
2. Unblocked, i.e., there does not exist a new transaction between a buyer and a seller that
both would choose to engage in given the opportunity (possibly no longer executing
other transactions they are a party to).
The notion of stability does not require that all contracts specify the same price (or quality).
Thus, traders, in their attempt to find contracting parties, are free to craft unique contracts
if they so desire. This flexibility inherent in the model allows the existence of multiple
qualities and multiple prices that differ across agents and serves as the foundation for non-
price competition to emerge. In Figure 1, no buyer who is part of a contract at the price
floor has an incentive to break the contract. Any sellers who are part of the excess supply
would engage in the contract at the price floor if the opportunity presented itself. However,
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the price floor prevents sellers from offering better terms to a buyer, and thus, no seller is
able to block the transaction of another seller. The allocation (pˆ, qˆ) is stable so long as the
suppliers in contracts have costs less than pˆ. Of course, as will be studied in the sections
below, a supplier who is unable to trade at pˆ, and has the capacity to offer a higher quality
at additional cost, may have an incentive to do so. This may result in multiple qualities
being exchanged in positive amounts in the market as part of a quality competition response
to the price control.
The basic parametric structure of the markets we study is developed in Section 2. Clearly,
the use of experimental methods places practical limitations on the economic environments
that can be studied. While the theory is applicable to a wide range of mathematically
tractable environments, the experimental design imposes a number of simplifying conditions,
such as an additively separable utility function over goods. The model, therefore, is developed
in the special context of that setting. While the basic principles are very general, the
precise predictions of the model suitable for study and testing obviously require an explicit
parametric structure.
The model is developed in detail in Section 3. We show that in the experimental en-
vironment, stable outcomes of the quality competition model always exist even when price
restrictions are present. In sum, stability is a natural generalization of competitive equi-
librium, and moreover, stable outcomes exist even when competitive equilibria do not exist
due to price controls. Stability is related to, but not the same as, the core. In our setting,
stability provides a sharper prediction, as the set of stable outcomes is a strict subset of the
core.5
Moreover, the quality competition model generates specific, nontrivial, predictions re-
garding how price floors affect quality, quantity, and transaction prices. When each buyer
places the same value on marginal changes of quality, and similarly each seller has the same
cost for marginal changes of quality, the model predicts that for price floors slightly above
5This difference becomes important when the agents have multiple units. The stable sets of the quality
competition model becomes the core if agents have only one unit: see Section 3.1.2.
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the competitive equilibrium price (for the efficient quality), agents either trade the efficient
quality at the price floor, or trade a good of quality one increment higher at a price reflect-
ing exactly the increase in a buyer’s utility (measured in dollars) from the quality difference.
However, as the price floor is raised, eventually all trade will happen at the higher quality,
and at a price strictly above the price floor. Analogous theoretical results are obtained for
price ceilings. Non-price competition and the possibility of multiple qualities and prices
existing in the market can be seen as a response to price controls.
Section 4 contains the experimental design developed to illustrate the specific predictions
of the quality competition model. Two different experimental configurations are used. The
first series of experiments takes place in an environment with several different qualities,
and was originally designed to simply look for the non-price competition through quality
adjustments. These experiments set the stage for the precise tests that follow and can be
viewed as a check of robustness. The second series of experiments employs specific choices of
parameters in order to investigate the specific predictions made by the quality competition
model. Section 4 also outlines performance measures used to make the comparisons.
Section 5 contains the detailed predictions of the model generated by the specific param-
eter values used in the experiments. Section 6 contains the results: as is shown, the first
experimental series demonstrates that the impact of the price constraints in the ten qualities
system is essentially as predicted by the model. The second experimental series illustrates the
support for the model in terms of the subtle configuration of prices and qualities predicted
by the model. Section 7 concludes.
2 Experimental Environment
The creation of an experimental environment that would support multiple different qualities
required special conditions about preferences and costs. In particular, strong conditions
about the separability of preferences and costs were required in order to give meaning to non-
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price competition and levels of quality. Markets were organized as continuous double auctions
because they are known to function well in multi-commodity economic environments.
Two series of experiments were conducted. The same parametric structure exists in
both series with a specialized functional form of the preferences. Series 1 involved ten good
qualities while Series 2 involved three. Preferences induced in both series were of the same
form in which utility depended both on the total units of all quantities and the amount of
each quality individually. While the theoretical model is based on the concept of trades,
which will be developed in Section 3, preference inducement was implemented in terms of
the allocations described here.
For a buyer b let the vector (xb1, . . . , x
b
m) be the consumption level of each of the m
different qualities. The utility function of each buyer is of the form:
ub(xb1, . . . , x
b
m) = f
b
(
m∑
j=1
xbj
)
+
m∑
j=1
abjx
b
j.
For a seller s let the vector (xs1, . . . , x
s
m) be the production level of each of the m different
qualities. The utility function of each seller is of the form:
us(xs1, . . . , x
s
m) = −cs
(
m∑
j=1
xsj
)
−
m∑
j=1
asjx
s
j .
From the functional form of the utility functions, it can be seen that with a proper choice
of parameters the demand functions are downward-sloping (with respect to the quantity
consumed) and the supply functions are upward-sloping (with respect to the quantity pro-
duced). In the experimental markets, the marginal benefit of an increase in quality is the
same for all buyers and the marginal cost of an increase in quality is the same for all sellers.
However, buyers’ and sellers’ preferences differed with respect to the amount of utility from
a given quantity. The actual parameters used in experiments are contained in Section 4.
Figure 2 illustrates the substance of Series 1 in which agents were placed in a market
environment where buyers and sellers may transact multiple units of any of ten qualities
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Figure 2: An economy with multiple qualities and a price floor.
denoted A,B, . . . , J where A is the lowest quality and J is the highest quality. Shown are the
“isolated” demand and supply curves for the D and G qualities, i.e., the demand and supply
curves illustrated as if only that quality existed. The isolated equilibrium price and quantity
are shown for each of the ten qualities as a small disc. As quality increases, the benefit of an
incremental increase in quality is reduced while the cost of an incremental increase in quality
is increased; hence, there exists an efficient quality, quality D, that maximizes consumer plus
producer surplus.
Experiments with general equilibrium have demonstrated the propensity for markets with
multiple qualities to converge to the general competitive equilibrium. Consequently, only
a small number of experiments were conducted in this Series 1 framework as a test of our
setting and procedures. The results compare reasonably well with known results. Indeed,
as will be documented in Section 6.1, when prices are unconstrained, quality D tended to
emerge and trade at the isolated equilibrium price and quantity while the volume of other
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qualities moved toward zero.
Series 1 was also designed to assess the implications of a price floor placed above the
competitive equilibrium price for the efficient quality. For selected sessions of Series 1 a
price floor was imposed at 6000 (denoted in Figure 2 by a dashed horizontal line), a price
that is above the isolated competitive equilibrium price of quality G and below the isolated
competitive equilibrium price of H (and hence above the unconstrained competitive equilib-
rium price of quality D). As will be documented in Section 6.1, non-price competition did
emerge in the form of buyers and sellers transacting for higher quality goods—in particular,
the the theory developed in Section 3 suggests that agents will trade quality G goods at a
price of 6000, which is denoted with a circle in Figure 2.
Quantity
p f
p

Price
(a) Low price floor.
Quantity
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p
Price
(b) High price floor.
Study of the data from Series 1 led to the development of the quality competition model
(detailed in Section 3) and the design of the Series 2 experiments. Hence, Series 2 experiments
are designed to test the very stark and unintuitive predictions of the model (which apply to
both price floors and price ceilings). For price floors, the model predicts that equilibria will
take one of two different forms, depending on the level of the price floor. In the first form,
depicted in Figure 3(a), the price pf floor is just above the isolated competitive equilibrium
price for some quality qˆ; the theory predicts that trade in two different qualities will emerge:
trade in quality qˆ goods will take place at the price floor pf , while trade of goods with quality
one increment higher, q¯ will take place at a price p˜ reflecting the difference in a buyer’s
valuation for the two goods. In the second form of equilibria, depicted in Figure 3(b), the
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price floor pf is significantly above the isolated competitive equilibrium price for quality q
goods (but below the isolated competitive equilibrium price for the next higher quality q¯).
In that case, all trade takes place at q¯ at the isolated competitive equilibrium price for q¯,
denoted p¯. Note that in this case, the price constraint is not binding in the usual sense, yet
equilibrium behavior is influenced by the presence of the price constraint.
Similar logic holds for the case of price floors. Our experimental work considers both
price floor and ceilings, as detailed in Section 4 below.
3 The Quality Competition Model
3.1 Framework
The theoretical development is in terms of trades as opposed to allocations. There is a finite
set of buyers B and a finite set of sellers S. Any given buyer and seller can make a trade
ω that denotes a buyer b(ω) ∈ B, a seller s(ω) ∈ S, and a quality q(ω) ∈ Q, where Q is
defined as a set of consecutive integers {qmin, . . . , qmax}. If one seller sells multiple units of
the same quality good to a buyer, this relationship will be represented by multiple trades.
The finite set of trades is given by Ω. For a given set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω, let Ψb be the set
of trades in Ψ associated with buyer b, i.e., Ψb ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : b(ω) = b}, and similarly let
Ψs ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : s(ω) = s}.
We can define transactions in terms of contracts. A contract (ω, pω) is a trade along
with an associated transfer price; the set of contracts is given by X ≡ Ω × R. For a
contract x = (ω, pω), we let b(x) ≡ b(ω), s(x) ≡ s(ω), q(x) ≡ q(ω), and p(x) ≡ pω.
We also define b(Y ) ≡ ⋃x∈Y b(x) and s(Y ) ≡ ⋃x∈Y s(x). Finally, we let Yb be the set of
contracts in Y associated with buyer b, i.e., Yb ≡ {x ∈ X : b(x) = b}, and similarly let
Ys ≡ {x ∈ Y : s(x) = s}; we let the set of all agents associated with some contract in Y be
denoted as a(Y ) ≡ b(Y ) ∪ s(Y ).
We also define a price vector p ∈ RΩ which states a price pω for each ω ∈ Ω. An
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arrangement [Ψ; p] is a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω and a price vector p ∈ RΩ.
A set of contracts Y ⊆ X is an outcome if it is feasible, that is no two contracts refer
to the same trade: if (ω, pω), (ω, p˜ω) ∈ Y , then (ω, pω) = (ω, p˜ω). Note that in contrast to
arrangements, an outcome Y only describes prices for those trades that are part of contracts
in Y . Let
τ(Y ) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : (ω, pω) ∈ Y for some pω ∈ R},
the set of trades associated with contracts in Y . For an arrangement [Ψ; p], let
κ([Ψ; p]) ≡ {(ω, p˜ω) ∈ X : ω ∈ Ω and p˜ω = pω},
be the set of contracts that execute the trades Ψ at prices p in the arrangement [Ψ; p].
3.1.1 Preferences
Consistent with the theoretical development, preferences will be described in terms of trades
as opposed to allocations introduced in the previous section. The exact parameters will be
described in later sections
The valuation function ub of buyer b ∈ B for a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is given by
ub(Ψ) ≡ f b(|Ψb|) +
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω))
where f b(n) is the value b obtains from procuring n goods and v(q) is the additional utility
b obtains from procuring a good of quality q. Let f b be strictly increasing and concave, and
let v be strictly concave.
The valuation function of seller s ∈ S for a set of trades Ψ ⊆ Ω is given by
us(Ψ) ≡ −cs(|Ψs|)−
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω))
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where cs is the cost s incurs from producing n goods and e(q) is the additional cost s incurs
from producing a good of quality q. Let cs be strictly increasing and convex, and let e be
strictly convex.6
For ease of exposition, we assume that there is a unique quality qˆ that maximizes surplus,
i.e.,
{qˆ} ≡ arg max
q∈Q
v(q) + e(q),
and furthermore that qˆ is neither the highest nor lowest quality, i.e., qmin < qˆ < qmax.
The utility functions of a buyer b ∈ B and a seller s ∈ S for an outcome Y ⊆ X are
given by
U b(Y ) ≡ ub(τ(Y ))−
∑
y∈Y
p(y),
U s(Y ) ≡ us(τ(Y )) +
∑
y∈Y
p(y).
For an arrangement [Ψ; p], we let U i([Ψ; p]) ≡ U i(κ([Ψ; p])) for all i ∈ B ∪ S.
Using these utility functions we define the demand correspondence for i ∈ B ∪ S given a
price vector p ∈ R|Ω| as
Di(p) ≡ arg max
Ψ⊆Ωi
U i([Ψ; p]).
Similarly, we define the choice correspondence from a finite set of contracts Y ⊆ X as
Ci(Y ) ≡ arg max
Z⊆Yi
U i(Z)
3.1.2 Definition of Equilibrium
We now define two distinct notions of equilibrium, competitive equilibrium and stability.
6This characterization of buyer and seller’s utility functions is equivalent to the cardinality condition of
Bevia et al. (1999). These assumptions on preferences and agents are more restrictive assumptions than is
necessary for some of our results; however, these assumptions closely parallel our experimental design. For
a more general model (without price restrictions), see Hatfield et al. (2012).
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Definition. A competitive equilibrium is an arrangement [Ψ; p] such that
Ψi ∈ Di(p)
for all i ∈ B ∪ S.
This definition encodes both individual optimization (as each agent demands an optimal
set of trades, given prices) and market clearing (as a buyer demands an object from a seller
at a given price if and only if the seller is willing to sell him that item).
We now define stability:
Definition. An outcome A ⊆ X is stable if it is
1. Individually rational : for all i ∈ B ∪ S, A ∈ Ci(A).
2. Unblocked : there does not exist a nonempty blocking set Z ⊆ X such that
(a) Z ∩ A = ∅, and
(b) for all i ∈ a(Z), we have that Zi ⊆ Y i for all Y i ∈ Ci(Z ∪ A).
The first condition, individual rationality, states that no agent is strictly better off by
choosing a strict subset of his contracts in A. The second condition states that there does
not exist a set of contracts Z such that all the agents involved in Z would strictly prefer to
sign all of them (and possibly drop some of their existing contracts in A) to sticking with
their contracts in A.
Note that a blocking set may be of any size and involve an arbitrary number of agents.
However, in the context of our quality competition model, for any blocking set Z, the set
{z} ⊆ Z is also a blocking set. In other words, for any blocking set, any contract within
that blocking set is a blocking set in and of itself. Hence, while an outcome is stable only if
there does not exist a blocking set, for any outcome that is not stable, the outcome is either
not individually rational or there exists a blocking set containing one contract.
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The notion of stability is also closely related to the core, defined below:
Definition. An outcome A is in the core if it is core unblocked, i.e., there does not exist a
set of contracts Z such that, for all i ∈ a(Z), U i(Z) > U i(A).
An outcome is in the core if there does not exist a set of agents who, by dropping all
of their current contracts and signing contracts only amongst themselves can make each of
them strictly better off. The definition of the core differs from the definition of stability in
two ways. First, a core block requires that all agents who are associated with the blocking
set drop all of their contracts with agents not associated with the blocking set; this is a
more stringent restriction than that imposed by stability, where agents associated with the
blocking set may retain previously held contracts. Second, a core block does not require
that Zi ∈ Ci(Z ∪ A) for all i ∈ a(Z); rather, it requires the less stringent condition that
U i(Z) > U i(A) for all i ∈ a(Z).
However, when preferences are substitutable, as is the case here, the set of competitive
equilibria, the set of stable outcomes, and the core are all closely related.
Theorem 1. For any competitive equilibrium [Ψ; p], κ([Ψ; p]) is a stable outcome; further-
more, any stable outcome is in the core. Conversely, for any core outcome A, there exists a
stable outcome Aˆ such that τ(A) = τ(Aˆ).
This theorem shows that when competitive equilibria exist, they induce stable outcomes.
In fact, when no price restrictions are present, a converse result holds as well: all stable
outcomes induce competitive equilibria. 7 However, when price restrictions are present,
competitive equilibria may not exist, and so stable outcomes do not, in general, induce
competitive equilibria.
While the core is a natural solution concept in this setting, it does not make specific pre-
dictions about prices, as if a buyer and seller may engage in multiple trades with each other,
7Formally, when we say that stable outcome induces a competitive equilibrium, we mean that for a stable
outcome A, there exists a price vector p˜ ∈ RΩ such that [τ(A); p˜] is a competitive equilibrium such that if
(ω, pω) ∈ A, then p˜ω = pω. See Hatfield et al. (2012) for a proof and discussion of this result.
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those trades can be at prices that are not supportable in a stable outcome or competitive
equilibrium. Furthermore, the set of realizable utility outcomes is strictly larger for the set
of core outcomes than for the set of stable outcomes. For instance, suppose there is only one
buyer b, one seller s, a set of trades Ω = {ψ, ω}, and let
ub(Ψ) = 4|Ψ|
us(Ψ) = −3 max{0, |Ψ| − 1};
the buyer has constant marginal utility from each item, while the seller only incurs a cost if
he sells both items. Then {(ψ, 2), (ω, 2)} is a core outcome, but it is not stable (and does not
induce a competitive equilibrium). In particular, the seller will obtain a utility of at least 3
in any stable outcome, but only receives a utility of only 1 in this core outcome.8
3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
Before we fully characterize the set of stable outcomes, it will be helpful to consider the case
where there are no price restrictions and the set of trades is restricted to one quality. Let
Ω(q¯) ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : q(ω) = q¯} and let X(q¯) ≡ Ω(q¯)× R.
Theorem 2. Suppose there are no price restrictions, and the set of contracts is given by
X(q¯). Then a stable outcome exists, and for any stable outcome A:
1. The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f(nb) + v(q¯)]−
∑
s∈S
[c(ns) + e(q¯)]
}
8Note that this phenomenon is only present if both buyers and sellers may demand multiple contracts. If
agents on one side of the market demand at most one contract, then the core and the set of stable outcomes
coincide; see Hatfield and Milgrom (2005). Furthermore, this phenomenon is present only when there are a
finite number of buyers and sellers or indivisible goods; for economies with a continuum of agents and divisible
goods, the set of competitive equilibria allocations again coincides with the core; see Kaneko and Wooders
(1986); Hammond et al. (1989); Kaneko and Wooders (1996).
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where ∑
b∈B
nb =
∑
s∈S
ns = n.
2. For all (ω, pω) ∈ A, pω ∈ [pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)], where
pmin(q¯) ≡ max
b∈B,s∈S
{f b(|Ab|+ 1)− f b(|Ab|) + v(q¯), cs(|As|)− cs(|As| − 1) + e(q¯)}
pmax(q¯) ≡ min
b∈B,s∈S
{f b(|Ab|)− f b(|Ab| − 1) + v(q¯), cs(|As|+ 1)− cs(|As|) + e(q¯)}
The theorem makes two specific predictions about behavior when only one quality is
available. First, the theorem predicts that a surplus-maximizing number of trades will take
place. Second, the theorem predicts that all trades will take place at a price in the interval
[pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)]. The lower bound of this interval is the minimal price such that no buyer
wishes to buy one more unit and every seller wishes to sell his prescribed number of units.
Conversely, the upper bound of this interval is the maximal price such that every buyer
wishes to buy his prescribed number of units, and no seller wishes to sell one more unit.
3.2.1 Without Price Restrictions
When no price restrictions are present the set of stable outcomes is as in Theorem 2 where
the one quality present is the efficient quality qˆ.
Theorem 3. Suppose there are no price restrictions. A stable outcome exists, and for any
stable outcome A, A is efficient and:
1. For all ψ ∈ τ(A), q(ψ) = qˆ.
2. The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f(nb) + v(qˆ)]−
∑
s∈S
[c(ns) + e(qˆ)]
}
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where ∑
b∈B
nb =
∑
s∈S
ns = n.
3. For all (ω, pω) ∈ A, pω ∈ [pmin(qˆ), pmax(qˆ)]
The theorem makes three specific predictions. First, the theorem predicts that all trade
will take place at the efficient quality qˆ. Second, the theorem predicts that a surplus-
maximizing number of trades will take place, given that quality. Finally, the theorem predicts
that all trades will take place at prices in the interval [pmin(qˆ), pmax(qˆ)]: The lower bound is
high enough such that no buyer wishes to buy an additional item, and every seller receives
nonnegative surplus from each item he sells, and, conversely, the higher bound is low enough
such that every buyer receives nonnegative surplus from each item he buys, and no seller
wishes to sell an additional item.
3.2.2 With Price Restrictions
We now consider the case where there is a price floor pf . In characterizing the set of stable
outcomes, there are essentially three cases to consider, as exemplified in Figure 3. The first
is that the price floor does not bind, i.e., pf < p
min(qˆ). In this case, the price floor has no
effect on the market, as the buyer and seller can always renegotiate to the efficient quality
in a contract that makes both parties better off.
In the second case, the price floor is above pmax(q) for some q ≥ qˆ, and below pmin(q+1)−
[v(q+ 1)− v(q)]; this is the case where the price floor lies above the lower set of dashed lines
but below the dotted lines in Figure 3. In that case, there may be trade at both the quality
q and q+ 1. The price of the higher quality good must be greater than the price of the lower
quality good by exactly the difference in the buyers’ valuation of the qualities; otherwise, a
buyer who is worse off given the current prices and the quality he is trading at will offer a
slightly higher price to a seller currently trading at the other quality. Furthermore, the lower
price must be at the price floor, as otherwise sellers of the (inefficiently) high quality good
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Quantity
Price
Figure 3: Illustration of the experimental market with two vertically differentiated qualities.
The double lines represent the demand and supply curves for the efficient low quality; the
light lines represent the demand and supply curves for the inefficiently high quality. The
dashed lines denote pmin(q) and pmax(q) for each quality q. The dotted black lines represent
pmin(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] and pmax(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)]. When the price floor is
below the lower set of dashed lines, Case 1 of Theorem 4 applies. When the price floor is
above the lower set of dashed lines but below the dotted lines, Case 2 of Theorem 4 applies.
Finally, when the price floor is above the dotted lines but below the higher set of dashed
lines, Case 3 of Theorem 4 applies.
would offer a buyer of the lower quality good the same good at a slightly lower price and
gain the efficiency surplus. However, when the prices differ by this exact amount, and the
lower quality good trades at the price floor, both qualities can trade in positive quantities as
part of a stable outcome. In this stable outcome, none of the sellers who are not currently
trading can make a positive profit by offering the higher quality good at a lower price, and
these sellers also can not offer the lower quality good at a lower price, as it is trading at the
price floor.
In the third case, the price floor is such that pf +[v(q+1)−v(q)] > pmax(q+1) holds; this
is the case where the price floor lies above the dotted lines in Figure 3. In this case, it will
no longer be possible to sell the quality q good, since there will be sellers without a current
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trading partner willing to trade the quality q+ 1 good at a price that makes it attractive to
current buyers of the quality q good. In that case, trade will be limited to only quality q+ 1
goods, so long as the price floor remains below pmin(q + 1); hence, the stable outcome will
be as if trade at only quality q + 1 was available. Note that, in this case, the price floor pf
affects the outcome even though no trade occurs at pf .
We formalize this discussion below.
Theorem 4. Consider a price floor pf . A stable outcome exists. There are three cases:
1. pf < p
min(qˆ): Then any stable outcome is as in Theorem 3.
2. pmax(q) < pf < p
min(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] for some q ≥ qˆ: Then in any stable
outcome A,
(a) For any contract x ∈ A, we have that either
i. q(x) = q and p(x) = pf , or
ii. q(x) = q + 1, and p(x) = pf + [v(q + 1)− v(q)].
(b) The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f b(nb) + v(q)− pf ]
}
where ∑
b∈B
nb = n.
3. pmax(q + 1) − [v(q + 1) − v(q)] < pf < pmin(q + 1) for some q ≥ qˆ: Then any stable
outcome is as in Theorem 2 with quality q + 1.
Imposing a price floor induces three separate forms of inefficiency. First, some agents may
contract at an inefficient quality. Second, some agents may not contract at all, even though
there exist surplus-increasing trades; for a contract to increase the welfare of both parties,
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it must have a price below the price floor. Finally, the wrong agents may contract—that
is, in case 2 of Theorem 4, there may be sellers who would like to contract with a buyer at
the price floor, and in fact have a lower marginal cost of production than a current seller;
however, they can not undercut that current seller due to the price floor.
We now consider the case where there is a price ceiling, which is analogous to the case
of a price floor, except that the roles of buyers and sellers are reversed.
Theorem 5. Consider a price ceiling pc. A stable outcome exists. There are three cases:
1. pc > p
max(qˆ): Then any stable outcome is as in Theorem 3.
2. pmin(q) > pc > p
max(q − 1) + [e(q) − e(q − 1)] for some q ≤ qˆ: Then in any stable
outcome A,
(a) For any contract x ∈ A, either
i. q(x) = q and p(x) = pc, or
ii. q(x) = q − 1 and p(x) = pc − [e(q)− e(q − 1)].
(b) The number of contracts |A| is an element of
arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
s∈S
[pc − c(nb)− e(q)]
}
where ∑
s∈S
ns = n.
3. pmin(q − 1) + [e(q) − e(q − 1)] > pc > pmax(q − 1) for some q ≤ qˆ: Then any stable
outcome is as in Theorem 2 with quality q − 1.
4 Experimental Series and Markets
The general structure of the experiments is contained in Table 1. A total of nine experi-
ments were conducted. Each experiment consisted of 7-8 buyers and 7-8 sellers. Subjects
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were undergraduate students at the California Institute of Technology who had previous
experience in participating in computerized double auction markets. Subjects were located
in the Caltech Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science and each ex-
periment lasted about three hours. A subject was randomly assigned to be either a seller
or a buyer upon arrival. Subjects were then given instructional sheets, record sheets, and
payoff tables that described his or her own redemption values or costs.
All markets were conducted through Caltech’s electronic market system, Marketscape.
This program supports multiple markets through a double auction system with an open
book, and meets standard conditions for market experiments. Goods of varying quality may
be traded, and the order book for each good is visible to all of the participants. The best
buy offers and the best sell offers in all markets are public on a single screen as are the prices
of the last contracts accepted in each of the markets. The system operates in a sequence of
periods. Each period is of fixed length and a countdown clock shows the number of seconds
left in a period. Buyers are free to submit orders to buy at a price and quantity, which are
entered into the book, where they remain until traded or cancelled. Similarly, sellers submit
sell orders of a price and quantity, which are entered into the sell order book. A buyer sees
a list of the sell orders listed from the lowest price to the highest for each quality market on
his/her screen, and a seller sees a corresponding list of the buy offers listed from the highest
price to the lowest for each quality market on his/her screen. These books are updated in
real time as new orders are submitted. A trade takes place when a buyer or seller submits
an order that “crosses” an offer of a counterparty.
When a period closes, a buyer’s earnings for that period are the total value of all goods
purchased minus the sum of the purchase prices. A seller’s earnings are the sum of the prices
for items he sold minus the costs of production.
Each period is independent: purchases and sales in a prior period have no effect on
another period’s payoffs. The subject has the opportunity to record and study profits for
the period and the profitability of previous periods. The number of periods is unknown to
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the subjects.
There were four types of buyers and four types of sellers in each session. The redemption
values and costs differed across different types. The information of each individual was
limited to information about his or her own payoff. They were not aware of the existence
of different types or the costs, payoffs, or conversion rates of others. The instruction sheet
can be found in Appendix B. The type of currency used in the experiments was francs. The
conversion rate differed across subjects, depending on their types. Before each experiment
started, a trial period was conducted to familiarize subjects with the procedure. Each
individual maintained his or her own record of activities and earnings but the records were
also maintained in the computer and were available to individual subjects at the end of
each period. During a period the computer maintained a real time record of purchases and
earnings, together with a time series of prices in each market.
4.1 Experimental Markets
As was outlined in Section 2, there were two series of experimental markets. Series 1 is
based on ten different qualities of the good, called A,B, . . . , J . A is the the lowest quality
(i.e., the quality with the lowest value to the buyer and the lowest cost to produce for the
seller), and J is the highest quality. We conducted five sessions in Series 1. The number
of sessions reflects the fact that the reliability of the competitive equilibrium model is well-
established—see Noussair et al. (1995, 1997), Anderson et al. (2004), Williams et al. (2000),
Bossaerts and Plott (2004), Crockett et al. (2011), Gjerstad (2011), among others.
We did not impose any price controls for the first two sessions (1.1 and 1.2). In the last
three sessions (1.3-5), we imposed a price floor of 6000, which is above pmax(G). In sessions
1.4 and 1.5, we removed the price floor in later periods to see if the market adjusts to the
competitive equilibrium.
In Series 2, there are three qualities, A, B, and C in the experimental market. We
conducted four sessions for Series 2, as the symmetry of the problem allows for pooling
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of data across experiments. In sessions 2.1 and 2.2, we imposed price floors of 1312 and
1470, respectively. These sessions correspond to the second and third cases of Theorem 4,
respectively. In sessions 2.3 and 2.4, we imposed price ceilings of 1088 and 930, which
correspond to the second and third cases of Theorem 5, respectively. In session 2.2, we
removed the price floor in the last 3 periods to see if the market adjusted to the competitive
equilibrium. The experimental conditions are summarized in Table 1.
4.2 Preferences and Incentive Procedures
4.2.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Buyers (sellers) were given tables stating their valuations (costs) of obtaining (producing) a
good depending on the good’s quality and how many goods had already been bought (sold)
by that agent. Table 2 shows the values given to a Type 1 buyer. For a buyer b of type k,
where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of b is given by
ub(|Ψ|) = ((6438− 150k)− 300|Ψb|)|Ψb|+
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω)),
where the utility v(q) obtained from a quality q good is given by
v(A) = 0, v(B) = 692 v(C) = 1250
v(D) = 1686 v(E) = 2012 v(F ) = 2240
v(G) = 2382 v(H) = 2450 v(I) = 2456
v(J) = 2412.
Table 2 also shows the costs given to a Type 1 seller. For a seller s of type k, where
k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of s is given by
us(|Ψ|) = −((3398 + 5k) + 10|Ψs|)|Ψs| −
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω)),
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where the disutility e(q) from producing a quality q good is given by
e(A) = 0 e(B) = 277 e(C) = 600
e(D) = 964 e(E) = 1368 e(F ) = 1807
e(G) = 2280 e(H) = 2782 e(I) = 3312
e(J) = 3865.
Notice the marginal utility from an additional unit depends only on the number of units
the buyer (seller) has already consumed (produced), not on the characteristics or combination
of units the buyer (seller) has already consumed (produced). This ensures that the marginal
valuation of an additional unit is independent of the composition of the commodities the
subject has already purchased or sold.
4.2.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
In Series 2, there were three qualities of goods, A, B, and C. Similar to Series 1, subjects
were given tables stating their valuations and costs. Table 3 shows the values given to a
Type 1 buyer. For a buyer b of type k, where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of b is
given by
ub(|Ψ|) = ((1690− 45k)− 90|Ψb|)|Ψb|+
∑
ω∈Ψb
v(q(ω)),
where the utility v(q) obtained from a quality q good is given by
v(A) = 0 v(B) = 600 v(C) = 800.
Note that, as in Series 1, the marginal utility of an additional good only depends on that
good’s quality and on the number of goods the agent has already bought, not the quality of
the goods the agent has already bought.
Table 3 also shows the costs given to a Type 1 seller in Series 2. For a seller s of type k,
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where k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, the valuation function of s is given by
us(|Ψ|) = −((−90 + 45k) + 90|Ψs|)|Ψs| −
∑
ω∈Ψs
e(q(ω)),
where the cost e(q) from producing a quality q good is given by
e(A) = 0 e(B) = 200 e(C) = 800.
Note that, as in Series 1, the marginal disutility of an additional good only depends on that
good’s quality and on the number of goods the agent has already sold, not the quality of the
goods the agent has already sold.
5 Model Predictions
5.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Experiments based on Series 1 parameters had ten qualities, as described in the introduction
and depicted in Figure 2. The quality D is the most efficient. With no price controls, in any
stable outcome (or competitive equilibrium) with 8 sellers and 8 buyers, 44 units of quality
D are traded at a price in the interval [4482, 4487].9 When there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers,
total surplus from trade is 73458 in any stable outcome.10
For sessions 1.3-5 a price floor of 6000 was imposed. The price interval for quality G
is [pmin(G), pmax(G)] = [5778, 5783]; the price interval for quality H is [pmin(H), pmax(H)] =
[6265, 6270]. The marginal value to the buyer of an increase in quality from G to H is 68.
Hence the set of stable outcomes is characterized by case 2 of Theorem 4. The theorem
predicts that 32 units of either quality G or H will be traded, with the price of G being 6000
9In experiments 1.2 and 1.3, we had 8 sellers and 7 buyers. In these experiments, 39 units of quality D
are traded at 4472 francs in any stable outcome. In experiment 1.5, we had 7 sellers and 7 buyers. In this
experiment, 39 units of quality D are traded at a price in the interval [4482, 4487] in any stable outcome.
10When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, total surplus is 65728 in any stable outcome. When there are 7
sellers and 7 buyers, total surplus is 65498 in any stable outcome.
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and the price of H being 6068. However, the minimum cost to produce good H is 6195,
which is greater than 6068, and so it is expected that all trade will be of quality G goods
at the price floor of 6000; this outcome is represented by the intersection of the price floor
and the demand curve for quality G goods.11 When there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers, total
surplus from trade is 48464 in any stable outcome.12
5.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
Experiments based on Series 2 parameters had three qualities. The “middle” quality B is the
most efficient. With no price controls, in any stable outcome (or competitive equilibrium)
with 8 sellers and 8 buyers, 44 units of quality B are traded at a price in the interval
[1190, 1210]. Total market surplus is 42460 in any stable outcome.
Quantity
1200
1600
1312
1512
Price
(a) pf = 1312.
Quantity
1200
1600
1470
Price
(b) pf = 1470.
Figure 4: In each subfigure, the lower pair of crossing lines denote the supply and demand for
the efficient quality B, while the upper pair of crossing lines denote the supply and demand
for the inefficiently high quality C; the dashed lines at 1190 and 1210 denote pmin(B) and
pmax(B), while the dashed lines at 1590 and 1610 denote pmin(C) and pmax(C). In Figure 4(a),
the black line at 1312 denotes the price floor at which quality B goods trade, while the dashed
line at 1512 denotes the price at which quality C goods trade. In Figure 4(b), the black line
at 1470 denotes the price floor; in this case, only quality C goods trade, and do so at a price
in the interval [1590, 1610].
11 When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.3, 28 units of G should be traded in any
stable outcome. When there are 7 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.5, 28 units of G should be traded
in any stable outcome.
12When there are 8 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.3, total surplus is 43446 in any stable outcome.
When there are 7 sellers and 7 buyers, as in experiment 1.5, total surplus is 43336 in any stable outcome.
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In session 2.1, a price floor pf = 1312 was introduced, as depicted in Figure 4(a); this
price floor is above the equilibrium price interval for the efficient quality B. The stable
outcome induced by this price floor is described in case 2 of Theorem 4, since
1312 = pf < p
min(C)− [v(C)− v(B)] = 1390.
Hence, from Theorem 4, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will trade at the
price floor of 1312, while quality C will trade at 1512, the price floor plus the value to the
buyer of an increase in quality from B to C. The total quantity traded will be 38 units when
there are 8 sellers and 8 buyers present. Total market surplus is in the interval [28200, 41800]
in any stable outcome.
In session 2.2, a price floor pf = 1470 was introduced, as depicted in Figure 4(b). The
stable outcome induced by this price floor is described in case 3 of Theorem 4, since
1470 = pf > p
max(C)− [v(C)− v(B)] = 1410.
Hence, from Theorem 4, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will not be traded,
while quality C will trade in the interval [1590, 1610]. The total quantity traded will be 34
units, and total market surplus is 26860 in any stable outcome; this outcome is depicted as
the crossing of the supply and demand curves for quality C in Figure 4(b).
Analogous arguments apply to the case of price ceilings. In session 2.3, a price ceiling
pc = 1088 was imposed, as depicted in Figure 5(a); this price floor is below the equilibrium
price interval for the efficient quality B. The stable outcome induced by this price floor is
described in case 2 of Theorem 5, since
1088 = pc > p
max(A) + [e(B)− e(A)] = 1010.
Hence, from Theorem 5, we have that in any stable outcome the quality B will trade at the
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1200
800
1088
888
Price
(a) pf = 1312.
Quantity
1200
800
930
Price
(b) pf = 1470.
Figure 5: In each subfigure, the upper pair of crossing lines denote the supply and demand for
the efficient quality B, while the lower pair of crossing lines denote the supply and demand
for the inefficiently low quality A; the dashed lines at 1190 and 1210 denote pmin(B) and
pmax(B), while the dashed lines at 790 and 880 denote pmin(A) and pmax(A). In Figure 5(a),
the black line at 1088 denotes the price ceiling at which quality B goods trade, while the
dashed line at 88 denotes the price at which quality A goods trade. In Figure 5(b), the black
line at 930 denotes the price floor; in this case, only quality A goods trade, and do so at a
price in the interval [790, 810].
price ceiling of 1088, while quality A will trade at 888, the price ceiling minus the extra cost
to the seller of an increase in quality from A to B. The total quantity traded will be 38
units, and the total market surplus is in the interval [28200, 41800] in any stable outcome.
In session 2.4, a price ceiling of pc = 930 was introduced, as depicted in Figure 5(b). The
stable outcome induced by this price ceiling is described in case 3 of Theorem 5, since
930 = pc < p
min(A) + [e(B)− e(A)] = 990.
Hence, from Theorem 5, in any stable outcome, the quality B will not be traded, while
quality A will trade in the interval [790, 810]. The total quantity traded will be 34 units,
and the total market surplus is 24860 in any stable outcome with 8 sellers and 8 buyers;
this outcome is depicted as the crossing of the supply and demand curves for quality C in
Figure 4(b). Note that in session 2.4 there were only 7 buyers and 7 sellers. The theoretical
predictions of the trading price remain the same but the stable outcome now entails only 30
units of quality A being traded. The total market surplus is 24060 in any stable outcome
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with 7 sellers and 7 buyers.
A summary of all predictions is given in the table below.
Table: Theoretical predictions (8 sellers and 8 buyers)
Quality Quantity Price Total surplus
Series 1
No price control D 44 [4482, 4487] 73458
Price floor 6000 G 32 6000 48464
Series 2
No price control B 44 [1190, 1210] 42460
Price floor 1312 B and C 38 1312(B), 1512(C) [28200, 41800]
Price floor 1470 C 34 [1590, 1610] 26860
Price ceiling 1088 A and B 38 888(A), 1088(B) [28200, 41800]
Price ceiling 930 A 34 [790, 810] 26860
6 Results
The discussion of results is heavily influenced by the exploratory nature of the experiments.
The original Series 1 experiments were motivated by empirical questions regarding non-price
competition and quality adjustments. Hence, Series 1 experiments were designed to incor-
porate a broad environment consisting of several qualities; they were designed without the
insight of a theory that might make specific predictions regarding prices, qualities and vol-
umes. By contrast, Series 2 experiments were designed to test the predictions of the specific
theory that revealed itself after the small number of experiments conducted in Series 1.
Thus, Series 1 could properly be discussed as a robustness check of the results from
Series 2 and discussed following a discussion of the results of Series 2. However, we discuss
Series 1 first because the development of the theory was motivated by the results of Series
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1, even though the data from Series 1 are sparse and become convincing only when viewed
in the light of the Series 2 data.
6.1 Series 1 (Ten Qualities)
Our first result shows that in the sessions with ten qualities and no price restrictions, the
price and quantity traded of each quality of good essentially converged to the predictions of
the model. The result reveals a slight extension of the well-established property of markets
with multiple goods to converge to near the general competitive equilibrium.13 The data
are consistent with a large number of studies and, in light of the results of the Series 2
experiments, become a robustness check on the results for Series 2. Hence, only the data
necessary to check for the predicted patterns was collected.
Result 1. In the absence of any price restrictions for the Series 1 market, the market
efficiency, the market volume, the pattern of qualities traded, and the price of the efficient
quality are all drawn to the competitive equilibrium/stable outcome values.
The data from Series 1 consists of twenty periods (seven periods from 1.1, three periods
from 1.2 and four periods from 1.4) and 596 transactions. The competitive equilibrium
predicts that the market efficiency will be 100%. Table 4 shows market efficiency in each
period for each session in Series 1. When no price restrictions are imposed, the average
efficiency is over 90% for all sessions, except for session 1.2 in which there are only three
periods, but even there the market efficiency reaches 95.2% in the third period in this session.
Efficiency also tends to increase over periods.
Volumes are also shown in Table 4. The competitive equilibrium predicts that quality D
will emerge with an equilibrium quantity of 44 units; moreover, given the structure of de-
mands, so long as no buyer or seller makes a loss, the sum of the volumes of all qualities can
be no greater than 44 units. As shown in the table the average number of units traded by
period is 42.5, which is very close to the theoretical prediction.
13See Noussair et al. (1995, 1997), among others.
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Table 5 summarizes the proportion of trade by quality during the second half of periods
5-7 in session 1.1. 62.1% of trades are for quality D goods while, in any stable outcome or
competitive equilibrium, we expect 100% of trades to take place for qualityD goods; however,
the proportion of goods traded at quality D does clearly rise throughout the experiments.
Moreover, the highest percentage is 12.1%, which is captured by qualities C and E, which
are most efficient qualities besides D.
Prices for quality D goods are also very close to the prices predicted by the model. The
average traded price for quality D goods is 4503.7 during the second half of Periods 5-7 in
session 1.1, while the range of competitive equilibrium prices is [4482, 4487]; the difference
between the average traded price and the theoretical prediction is 0.3%.
While the data are sparse, it is possible to pool across sections in order to increases
the statistical power. Statistical testing of static equilibrium models may be enhanced by
the use of the time series of the price discovery process. Following the methodology of
Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1995, 1997) and Myagkov and Plott (1997), we estimate the
Ashenfelter/El-Gamal model of market convergence for our data. This model assumes that
the average price for each experiment may start from a different origin but all markets
will experience adjustment, as described by a common functional form, and converge to a
common asymptotic value.
The parameter of interest for the Series 1 experiments when no price control is imposed
is the equilibrium price of quality D. Hence, we estimate
p¯ti(D)−
pminD + pmax(D)
2
= β1d1
1
t
+ β2d2
1
t
+ β4d4
1
t
+ γ(1− 1
t
) + uti
where i indicates the particular experiment, and t represents time as measured by the number
of market periods in the experiment. We let p¯ti(D) denote the mean traded price in period t;
recall that the theoretical prediction is that the price lies in the interval [pmin(D), pmax(D)].
We let di be a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for the experiment i, and 0 otherwise
14
14We do not use the data from Session 1.5 because there are only two periods in which a price control
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The parameter βi represents the the origin of a possible convergence process for session i.
The parameter γ represents the asymptotic difference between the common asymptotic value
and the theoretical prediction; hence, γ will be close to 0 if the difference between the traded
prices and the theoretical prediction approaches 0 toward the end of each experiment. The
random error term uti is distributed normally with mean zero.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. The estimated coefficient of γ is not significantly
different from 0, indicating that the traded prices of quality D are not significantly different
from the midpoint of the theoretical prediction near the end of the experimental sessions.
Our second result examines whether the experimental outcomes when a price floor of 6000
is imposed are consistent with the patterns predicted by the quality competition model.
Result 2. When a price floor of 6000 is imposed for the Series 1 market, the quality of goods
traded, the prices of traded goods, the market volume, and the market efficiency converge
to stable outcome values.
Table 4 shows that when the price floor of 6000 is imposed, the average market efficiency
converges to the efficiency predicted by the theory. In the stable outcome, 66% of the possible
efficiency gains are realized, while the average market efficiency in the experimental sessions
was 62.4%. Table 5 shows that 83.6% percent of trades are for quality G goods during the
second half of periods 5-8 of session 1.3 and periods 5-6 of session 1.5. All traded prices
were 6000 during these periods, obviating the need for statistical analysis, as the theoretical
prediction matched the experimental outcome exactly. The average number of trades per
period was also very close to the stable outcome values for each session, as shown in Table 4.
6.2 Series 2 (Three Qualities)
In Series 2, four experimental sessions were conducted, as described in Section 4. In each
session, the data converge tightly to the the patterns suggested by the stable outcome; the
was not imposed. For session 1.4, we use data only from periods 4 to 7, i.e. those periods in which a price
control was not imposed.
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characteristics of the stable outcome for each session were described in Section 5. The results
of each session are discussed independently in order to illustrate the pattern of observed
behaviors in relation to the model. However, the symmetry of the experimental design
allows the data to be pooled for increased statistical power. As the data converged so tightly
and so quickly there seemed to be little to learn from additional sessions with the same
parameters. Tables 7 to 10 provide the time series of average prices and volumes by period
for each session and can be used as reference to the structure of results.
Results 3 and 4 address the case of the price floors imposed during sessions 2.1 and 2.2.
The price floor is only 1312 in session 2.1, and hence the theory predicts that two qualities
may trade in positive amounts. The price floor is raised to 1470 in session 2.2, and hence the
theory predicts that only the highest quality will trade in positive amounts. For both cases
the results are close to all predictions of the model. The price floor was removed in Session
2.2 due to the fact that the data were so close to the predictions and thus an opportunity
to test the consequence of floor removal presented itself.
Result 3. When a price floor of 1312 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the prices, the
market volumes, the quality of goods traded, and the market efficiency all converge to the
stable outcome values.
Figure 6 shows traded prices in session 2.1 and Table 7 contains the related average period
prices, variances, and market volumes for each quality. Quality B goods move quickly to
trade at the stable outcome price floor of 1312; the variance falls to zero and remains there.
Quality C also trades as predicted—the average price in the last period is 1496, which is
very near to the predicted price of 1512, and the price variance falls from period 6 onwards
to near zero. Finally, as predicted, the there is very little trade in quality A. Moreover, total
market volume over the last half of the session is very close to the predicted quantity (40.4
as compared to 38, or 6.3%). Table 7 also shows the market efficiency, which is within the
theoretically predicted interval of [0.664, 0.984] in all periods.
Result 4. When a price floor of 1470 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the prices, the
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Figure 6: Experimental data for session 2.1 when a price floor of 1312, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The diamonds denote trades of the high quality good (quality C),
the circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and the crosses trades of the low
quality good (quality A). The thin line at 1512 denotes the predicted price of trades with
high quality goods. The experiment took place over 9 periods, delineated by the vertical
dashed gray lines.
market volumes, the quality of goods trade and the market efficiency all converge to the stable
outcome values. When the price floor is removed the markets move quickly to the stable
outcome in the absence of price controls, which corresponds to a competitive equilibrium.
Figure 7 shows prices for each transaction in session 2.2 and Table 8 contains the related
average period prices, variances, and market volumes for each quality. The theory predicts
that goods of quality A will not trade, and indeed there is only one transaction at that
quality when the price floor is imposed. The theory also predicts that goods of quality B
will not trade, and on average there were two trades per period of quality B goods. The
theory predicts that quality C goods will trade in the interval [1590-1610], which is very near
the average price of 1589.8 the last period before the price floor was removed. Market volume
for quality C is 32 units for the last period, which compares well to the theoretical volume
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Figure 7: Experimental data for session 2.2 when a price floor of 1470, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The diamonds denote trades of the high quality good (quality C),
the circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and the crosses trades of the low
quality good (quality A). The thin lines at 1590 and 1610 denote the range of predicted prices
of trades with high quality goods. The experiment took place over 7 periods, delineated by
the vertical dashed gray lines. The price floor was removed after Period 4.
of 34; total volume of Quality B and quality C is 34 units for the last period. Table 8 also
shows the market efficiency for each period: average market efficiency for the periods when
the price floor was imposed is 78.3%, which is slightly higher than the predicted efficiency
of 69.3%.
Figure 7 also shows how quickly the market adjusts to the competitive equilibrium,
which can be seen as a test of how quickly market outcomes move from one stable outcome
to another in response to change in the environment. As soon as the price floor is removed,
trade shifts from quality C goods to quality B goods; moreover, the price of quality B goods
adjusts from 1470 to 1193 in the last period, which is within the competitive equilibrium
interval of [1190-1210]. Furthermore, market volume increases to 44 in the last two periods,
as suggested by the theory. Finally, efficiency rose to nearly 100%, as predicted.
35
× ×
× ×
× ×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
×
Time
1088
888
1190
Price
Figure 8: Experimental data for session 2.3 when a price ceiling of 1088, denoted by the
thick gray line, was imposed. The diamonds denote trades of the high quality good (quality
C), the circles trades of the medium quality good (quality B), and the crosses trades of the
low quality good (quality A). The thin line at 888 denotes the predicted prices of trades of
quality A goods.
Results 5 and 6 address the case of the price ceilings imposed during sessions 2.3 and 2.4.
The price ceiling is 1088 in session 2.3, and hence the theory predicts that two qualities may
trade in positive amounts. The price floor is lowered to 930 in session 2.4, and hence the
theory predicts that only the lowest quality will trade in positive amounts. For both cases
the results are close to all of the predictions of the model.
Result 5. When a price ceiling of 1088 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the prices, the
market volumes, the quality of goods traded, and the market efficiency all converge to the
stable outcome values.
Figure 8 shows the price for each transaction in session 2.3 and Table 9 contains the
related average prices, price variance, market volumes, and market efficiency for each period.
Quality B moves quickly to trade at 1088, the price predicted by the quality competition
model; the price variance falls to zero and remains there. Quality A also trades as predicted—
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Figure 9: Experimental data for session 2.4 when a price ceiling of 930, denoted by the thick
gray line, was imposed. The circles denote trades of the medium quality good (quality B),
and the crosses trades of the low quality good (quality A). The thin lines at 790 and 810
denote the range of predicted prices of trades of low quality goods.
the average price in the last period is 879.5, which is very near the predicted price of 888,
the variance has a tendency to fall over time, actually equaling zero in the next to the last
period. Finally, as predicted, there is very little trade in quality C. Moreover, total market
volume over the last of the session is very close to the predicted quantity(40.4 as compared
to 38, or 6.3%). Table 9 also shows the market efficiency in all periods, which is within the
theoretically predicted interval of [0.664, 0.984] in all periods.
Result 6. When a price ceiling of 930 is imposed for the Series 2 market, the prices, the
market volumes, the quality of goods trade and the market efficiency all converge to the
stable outcome values.
Figure 9 shows the price for each transaction in session 2.4 and Table 10 contains the
related average prices, price variance, market volumes, and market efficiency for each period.
The theory predicts that quality C will not trade, and indeed there are no transactions of
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quality C goods. The theory also predicts that gods of quality B will not trade, and there
are only two instance of quality B trading after the first two periods. The theory predicts
that quality A goods will trade with a price in the interval [790, 810]; the average price of
quality A falls within this interval for the last two periods; moreover, the price variance for
quality A is quite small in the last two periods. Market volume for quality A is 32 units for
the last period, which compares well to the theoretical volume of 34. Table 10 also shows the
market efficiency for each period: average market efficiency for the periods when the price
floor was imposed is 67.4%, which is slightly lower than the predicted efficiency of 69.3%.
The summary of the patterns of activity across experiments is best captured by pooling
the observations and performing a general test comparing the measurement to the theory.
For this purpose we estimate the Ashenfelter/El-Gamal model of market convergence for the
Series 2 experiments. We first consider price controls that result in outcomes described in
the second part of Theorems 4 and 5. Hence, we estimate the difference between the traded
price and the theoretical prediction for session 2.1 and 2.3 of quality C and quality A goods,
respectively, denoting this Y¯ ti . We estimate
Y¯ ti = β1d1
1
t
+ β3d3
1
t
+ γ
(
1− 1
t
)
+ uti
where we let i denote the particular experiment, and t denote time as measured by the
number of market periods in the experiment. We use the difference between mean traded
prices and theoretical predictions as a dependent variable, instead of mean traded prices, as
theoretical predictions differ across different treatments.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. The estimated coefficient of γ is not significantly
different from 0, indicating that the traded prices are not significantly from the theoretical
predictions different near the end of the experimental sessions in this regime.
We then consider price controls that result in outcomes described in the third parts of
Theorems 4 and 5. Hence, we estimate the difference between the traded price and the
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theoretical prediction for sessions 2.2 and 2.4 of quality C and quality A goods, respectively.
In session 2.2, the price floor was removed after period 4 and so we only use data until period
4. We estimate
p¯ti(q)−
pmin(q) + pmax(q)
2
= β2d2
1
t
+ β4d4
1
t
+ γ
(
1− 1
t
)
+ uti
where q = C when a price floor is imposed, and q = A when a price ceiling is imposed.
Table 6 contains the estimation results. Note that the model predicts that γ will fall
within the interval [−10, 10], as pmax(q) − pmin(q) = 20 for this experiment for all q ∈ Q;
the estimated coefficient of γ is −8.3, indicating that trade near the end of the experimental
sessions is occurring at prices within the theoretically predicted interval.
7 Conclusion
We have focused on a market in which multiple qualities of the commodity may be bought
and sold. In this environment, when no price controls are imposed, competitive equilib-
ria exist, and naturally correspond to matching-theoretic stable outcomes. However, in the
presence of price controls, competitive equilibria need not exist, but the equilibria of the
quality competition model, based on matching-theoretic stable outcomes, do exist. Thus,
the quality competition model is a natural generalization of the competitive equilibria for
such environments. Furthermore, the predictions of the quality competition model capture
the behavior of laboratory experimental markets along multiple dimensions (price, quality,
market volumes, and market efficiency). This experimental agreement between pure theory
and experiment is particularly surprising given the imperfect information available to exper-
imental subjects: they were informed only of their own valuations and not those of other
participants.
The work presented here suggests that matching theory can provide a theoretical basis
for the intuition that price controls induce non-price competition. Economic intuition sug-
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gests that attempts to avoid price controls will lead markets to respond to price floors by
quality enhancements and to respond to price ceilings with lowered quality. The theoretical
predictions of Theorems 4 and 5 show that observed quality responds in ways suggested by
economic intuition to price controls. Furthermore, the predicted non-price competition is
very visible in the data.
This work also suggests that matching theory and other cooperative game-theoretic ap-
proaches may be useful in other contexts in which competitive equilibria fail to exist. For
instance, when production quotas are imposed (such as due to trade restrictions), competi-
tive equilibria may fail to exist, but such economies may be able to be modeled within the
framework of matching theory, as suggested by Ostrovsky (2008).15 Similarly, in settings
with fixed costs, competitive equilibria often fail to exist due to the nonconvexities inher-
ent in those settings (see, e.g., Eswaran, Lewis and Heaps (1983)), and it may be that stable
outcomes exist in some such markets. Finally, the model described here may also used to un-
derstand markets with imperfect competition—see the recent work by Azevedo and Leshno
(2011) and Azevedo (2011). We conjecture that stability may provide a robust solution
concept for predicting behavior in these settings as well.
15Indeed, the work of Ostrovsky (2008) suggests that such constraints may be incorporated even when the
quota-restricted good is an input to a downstream production process.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
See Theorems 6 and 10 in Hatfield et al. (2012).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Existence follows from Theorem 2 in Hatfield et al. (2012). The quantity predicted is the effi-
cient quantity, and that is part of any stable outcome: see Theorems 3 and 7 in Hatfield et al.
(2012).
For the final part of the proof, we need to show that all contracts (ω, pω) ∈ A transact
at a price pω ∈ [pmin(q¯), pmax(q¯)]. There are two cases to consider:
1. Suppose that pω < p
min(q¯) There are two cases to consider:
(a) Suppose that pω < f
b(|Ab| + 1) − f b(|Ab|) + v(b) for some buyer b. Then there
exists a blocking set of the form {(ψ, pψ)} where b(ψ) = b and s(ψ) = s(ω) along
with a price
pψ =
(f b(|Ab|+ 1)− f b(|Ab|) + v(q¯)) + pω
2
.
as both seller and buyer will choose this contract.
(b) Suppose that pω < c
s(|As|)− cs(|As| − 1) + e(q¯) for some seller s = s(ω). Then A
is not individually rational for S, as As − {(ω, pω)} makes s strictly better off.
2. The proof that pω < p
max(q¯) is analogous.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
From Theorems 2, 3, and 6 of Hatfield et al. (2012) a stable outcome exists and is efficient.
Hence it must only include contracts with quality qˆ. The bounds on the prices then follow
from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 2.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 4
We first prove existence of a stable outcome. We let
p¯B ≡ max
b∈B
f b(1)− f b(0) + v(qmax) + 1;
note that no contract (ω, pω) with a price pω > p¯
B can be individually rational for any
buyer, and so without loss of generality we may consider the contractual set X¯[pf ] ≡ {x ∈
X : p(x) ∈ [pf , p¯B]}.
PB(Z) ≡
{
(ω, pω) ∈ X[pf , p¯B] : pω = inf
(ω,pω)∈Z
pω
}
P S(Z) ≡
{
(ω, pω) ∈ X[pf , p¯B] : pω = sup
(ω,pω)∈Z
pω
}
We consider a model with augmented preferences, where each agent i is endowed with a
strict ordering ω1 i . . . i ωKi over trades involving i. This induces a strict ordering .i
over sets such that
Zˆ .i Z ⇔ |Zˆ| < |Z| or maxi τ(Z) unionsq τ(Zˆ) ∈ τ(Zˆ)
We define an augmented choice function on X˜[pf ]
Cˆb(Y ) ≡ max
.b
{Z ∈ Cb(PB(Y ))}
for each b ∈ B and
Cˆs(Y ) ≡ max
.s
{Z ∈ Cs(P S(Y ))}
for each s ∈ S, where max. denotes the maximal set according to the order .. Note that
this is a choice function, not a choice correspondence. Existence of a stable outcome A for
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these augmented preferences then follows as the existence proof in Hatfield and Kominers
(2011)—note that the assumption of a finite contractual set is not required for the proof of
existence in that work. Finally, since Cˆi(Y ) ∈ Ci(Y ) for all i ∈ B ∪ S and all Y ⊆ X, A is
a stable outcome for the original preferences.
We now characterize the set of stable outcomes, given the price restriction for each case.
There are three cases to consider:
1. pf < p
max(qˆ): Then the outcome described in Theorem 3 is still feasible, and hence
is stable as it is still individually rational and unblocked. (Note that all blocking sets
would also be blocking sets for the model with no price restrictions.)
2. pmax(q) < pf < p
min(q + 1)− [v(q + 1)− v(q)]: We proceed in several steps:
(a) We first show that pψ = pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))] for all (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈ A where
q(ψ) ≥ q(ω). There are two cases.
i. If pψ < pω + [v(q(ψ)) − v(q(ω))], we have that Z = {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking
set, where b(χ) = b(ω), s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ψ) and
pχ =
pψ + [pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))]]
2
.
This contract is chosen from A ∪ {(χ, pχ)} by b(χ), as it is strictly better for
b(χ) than (ω, pω); it is also chosen from A∪{(χ, pχ)} by s(χ), as it is strictly
better for s(χ) than (ψ, pψ).
16
ii. If pψ > pω + [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))], we have that Z = {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking set,
where b(χ) = b(ψ), s(χ) = s(ω), q(χ) = q(ω) and
pχ =
pω + [pψ − [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ω))]]
2
.
16Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) and (ω, pω) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
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This contract is chosen from A ∪ {(χ, pχ)} by b(χ), as it is strictly better for
b(χ) than (ψ, pψ); it is also chosen from A∪{(χ, pχ)} by s(χ), as it is strictly
better for s(χ) than (ω, pω).
17
(b) We now show that there are at most two consecutive qualities. Suppose not. Then
there exist (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈ A where q(ψ) > q(ω) + 1. Consider the contract χ
where b(χ) = b(ψ), s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ψ)− 1, and
pχ = pψ − [v(q(ψ))− v(q(ψ)− 1)]− 
for some small  > 0. Note that from part 2a, pψ = pω+[v(q(ψ))−v(q(ω))], which
implies that pχ > pω ≥ pf for  > 0 small enough, and hence (χ, pχ) is a valid
contract. {(χ, pχ)} is a blocking set, as both b(χ) and s(χ) are strictly better off
dropping (ψ, pψ) and choosing (χ, pχ).
18
(c) We now show that if two consecutive qualities are traded in a stable outcome A,
then one of them is traded at the price floor pf . Suppose not. Let (ψ, pψ), (ω, pω) ∈
A where q(ψ) = q(ω) + 1. Consider a contract (χ, pχ) such that b(χ) = b(ω),
s(χ) = s(ψ), q(χ) = q(ω), and pχ = pω −  for some small  > 0. {(χ, pχ)} is a
blocking set for  > 0 small enough, as both b(χ) and s(χ) are strictly better off
dropping (ω, pω) and (ψ, pψ) and choosing (χ, pχ)—note that the seller is better
off as he gains almost all the surplus from switching to a more efficient quality.19
(d) We now show that the two traded qualities are q and q + 1. It will be helpful to
define the following notation:
M(q) ≡ arg max
n∈Z≥0
{∑
b∈B
[f b(nb) + v(q)− pf ]
}
17Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ω, pω) and (ψ, pψ) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
18Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) was individually rational for b(χ) and s(χ).
19Note that (χ, pχ) must be individually rational, as (ψ, pψ) and (ω, pω) were individually rational for b(χ)
and s(χ), respectively.
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where ∑
b∈B
nb = n
To see that the two traded qualities are q and q + 1, suppose not; let the two
traded qualities be q′ and q′ + 1. There are two cases to consider:
i. Suppose that q′ > q; hence, pf < pmin(q′). There are two subcases to consider:
• Suppose that
pmin(q′) = max
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|+ 1)− f b(|Aˆb|) + v(q′)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′). Then at the price
pf the buyers strictly demand at least m + 1 goods of quality q
′, where
m = maxM(q′); however, there are at most m sellers willing to trade a
quality q′ at a price pf . Hence, either A is not individually rational or
there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ and pχ = pf +  for
 > 0 small enough with a buyer whose demand is not satisfied and a
current seller.
• Suppose that
pmin(q′) = max
s∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q′)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′). Then at the price
pf the buyers strictly demand at least m goods of quality q
′, where m =
minM(q′); while there are at most m−1 sellers willing to trade a quality
q′ at a price pf . Hence either A is not individually rational or there exists
a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ and pχ = pf +  for  > 0 small
enough with a buyer whose demand is not satisfied and a current seller.
ii. Suppose that q′ < q. hence, pf > pmax(q′ + 1). There are two subcases to
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consider:
• Suppose that
pmax(q′ + 1) = min
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|)− f b(|Aˆb| − 1) + v(q′ + 1)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′+ 1). Then at the price
pf the buyers demand at most m−1 goods of quality q′+1 or less, where
m = minM(q′ + 1); however, there are at least m sellers willing to trade
a quality q′ + 1 or less at a price pf . Hence either A is not individually
rational or there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where q(χ) = q′ + 1 and
pχ = pf + [v(q
′ + 1)− v(q′)]−  for  > 0 small enough with a seller who
is not satisfied and a current buyer.
• Suppose that
pmax(q′ + 1) = min
S∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q′ + 1)
}
.
for some Aˆ that is stable for the contract set X(q′ + 1). Then at the
price pf the buyers demand at most m goods of quality q
′ + 1 or less,
where m = maxM(q′ + 1); however, there are at least m + 1 sellers
willing to trade a quality q′ + 1 or less at a price pf . Hence either A is
not individually rational or there exists a blocking set {(χ, pχ)} where
q(χ) = q′ + 1 and pχ = pf + [v(q′ + 1)− v(q′)]−  for  > 0 small enough
with a seller who is not satisfied and a current buyer.
(e) The above results imply that if both q and q + 1 quality goods are traded, they
must be traded at prices pf and pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)]. If only quality q is
traded, it must be traded at pf , as if any other contract of the form (ω, pω) exists,
there will exist a blocking set of the form {(ψ, pω+pf
2
)}, as we know at a price
pf > p
max(q) more sellers will demand to sell a good of quality q then there are
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buyers willing to buy such a good. If only quality q + 1 is traded, then it must
trade at pf + [v(q+ 1)− v(q)], as if there exists a contract for a quality q+ 1 good
of the form (ω, pω) where pω > pf + [v(q + 1)− v(q)], then there is a blocking set
of the form {(ψ, pω − [v(q + 1) − v(q)])} where b(ψ) = b(ω), s(ψ) = s(ω), q(ψ) =
q(ω) + 1. If pω < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], there will exist a blocking set of the
form {(ψ, pω+pmin(q+1)
2
)}, as we know at a price pω < pmin(q + 1) more buyers will
demand to buy a good of quality q + 1 then there are sellers willing to sell such
a good.
(f) Finally, we prove that the number of trades is as given in the theorem. Suppose
not. It is clear that if m,m′ ∈ M(q) and m < mˆ < m′, then mˆ ∈ M(q). Hence,
there are two cases to consider:
i. Suppose |A| < m for all m ∈ M(q). Then there exists a buyer b such that
f b(|Ab|) + v(q) − pf > 0. Furthermore, there exists a seller s such that
pf − [cs(|As|) + e(q)] > 0 as we know from the definition of pmax(q) that the
number of items of quality q sellers are willing to sell at pf is strictly greater
than the number of items buyers are willing to buy. Hence, a set {(χ, pχ)}
such that b(χ) = b, s(χ) = s, q(χ) = q, and pχ = pf constitutes a blocking
set.
ii. Suppose |A| > m for all m ∈ M(q). Then there exists a buyer b such that
f b(|A|b) + v(q)− pf < 0. Then the outcome is not individually rational for b.
(Recall that the buyers are indifferent between the two qualities, given their
prices, in the stable outcome A.)
3. pmax(q+ 1)− [v(q+ 1)− v(q)] < pf < pmin(q+ 1): First, note that steps (a)-(d) of Case
2 still hold. We now show that no contract with a quality q good transacts as part of
a stable outcome. Suppose both qualities do trade in equilibrium. There are two cases
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(a) Suppose
pmax(q + 1) = min
b∈B
{
f b(|Aˆb|)− f b(|Aˆb| − 1) + v(q + 1)
}
.
Then since pmax(q + 1) < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], and all buyers receive the same
utility, there must be less than m buyers, where m = minM(q + 1). However,
sellers wish to sell at least m goods of quality q + 1 at that price. Hence there is
a blocking contract where a seller who is not currently signing a contract offers a
slightly lower price (and quality q + 1) to a buyer currently buying.
(b) Suppose
pmax(q + 1) = min
S∈S
{
cs(|Aˆs|)− cs(|Aˆs| − 1) + e(q + 1)
}
.
Then since pmax(q + 1) < pf + [v(q + 1) − v(q)], and all buyers receive the same
utility, there are at most m buyers, where m = maxM(q + 1). However, sellers
wish to sell at least m + 1 goods of quality q + 1 at that price. Hence there is a
blocking contract where a seller who is not currently signing a contract offers a
slightly lower price (and quality q + 1) to a buyer currently buying.
The rest of the proof then follows as in the proof of Theorem 2.
A.5 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is symmetric to the proof of Theorem 4.
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B Instructions
Introduction Welcome to the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science.
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are
simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money
which will be paid to you in cash. We are going to conduct a market in which you will be a
participant in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you
will find a table labeled PAYOFF TABLE that describes the value to you of any decisions
you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private
information. The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will
be in terms of francs. At the end of the experiment, your francs will be converted to dollars,
and paid to you in cash. Your conversion rate is found on your table of values/costs. It may
vary between people. Do not reveal this to anyone. The commodity being bought and sold
comes in 10 different qualities, ranging from A to J. You will be designated as either a buyer
or seller. If you are buyer your PAYOFF TABLE will be titled BUYER RECORD SHEET.
If you are a seller, your PAYOFF TABLE will be labeled SELLER RECORD SHEET.
Specific Instructions to Buyers During each market period you are free to purchase from
any seller or sellers as many units as you want. Each unit is one of ten different qualities,
ranging from A to J. For the first unit that you buy during a trading period, you will receive
the amount listed in the row marked “1st Unit Value” and the column corresponding to the
quality of the item on your TABLE OF VALUES. If you purchase a second unit during that
same period, you repeat the procedure, this time referring to the row marked “2nd Unit
Value”, and so on. Notice that your units increase regardless of the quality of the previous
units purchased. That is, for the first unit you follow the first row, regardless of quality
and for the second unit you follow the second row, regardless of the quality of the first unit.
Similarly for the third unit you follow the third row regardless of the quality of the previous
two unit. Your payoffs are computed as follows: you will receive the difference between the
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value on your table and what you paid for the purchase.
Earnings = Table Value – Purchase Price.
If the value of the item is greater than the purchase price you make money. If the value of the
item is less than the purchase price, you lose money. Your total payoffs will be accumulated
over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Specific Instructions to Sellers During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer
or buyers as many units as you might want. Each unit is one of seven different qualities,
ranging from A to G. The cost of the first unit that you sell during a trading period is listed
in the row marked “1st Unit Cost” and the column corresponding to the quality of the item
on your TABLE OF COSTS. If you sell a second unit during that same period, you repeat
the procedure, this time referring to the row marked “2nd Unit Cost”, and so on. Your
payoffs are computed as follows: you will receive the difference between the sale price of the
unit and its cost on your table.
Earnings = Sale Price – Cost of Unit
If the sale price of the item is greater than the cost you make money. If the sale price
is less than the cost, you lose money. Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several
trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Market Organization The exercise is organized as follows. The market will be conducted
in a series of trading periods. Each period lasts for at most 15 minutes. Any buyer is free
at any time during the period to make a verbal bid to buy a unit of a certain quality at a
specified price. Likewise, any seller is free to make a verbal offer, or “ask”, for one unit of a
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specified quality for a specified price. This is done by stating the quality, your ID number,
and your bid or ask is (example: “quality F, Buyer 2 bids 40” or “quality D, Seller 5 asks
200”.) Bids and asks are recorded on the blackboard by the market manager. Once a new
bid or ask is announced, any new bid for that quality must be higher than the previous bid
and any new ask for that quality must be lower than the previous ask. A unit is traded
when a buyer accepts an existing ask (i.e. calling out “Buyer 2 accepts for quality A”) or
when a seller accepts an existing bid (i.e. calling out “Seller 6 accepts quality G”). When
this happens, the buyer and the seller record the quality, price, and value or cost in the
appropriate column of their Record sheet. Each column represents a trading period. Buyers
and sellers can cancel their own asks or bids by calling out “Seller 7 cancels in quality B”
or “Buyer 3 cancels in quality C”. Except for the bids, asks, and cancellations, you are not
allowed to speak. There are likely to be many bids and asks that are not accepted, but you
are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can.
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C Tables
Table 1: Experiments and conditions
Series Experiment Condition Number of Subjects Number of Periods
1 1.1 No price constraints 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
1 1.2 No price constraints 8 sellers 7 buyers 3
1 1.3 Price floor (6,000) 8 sellers 7 buyers 8
1 1.4 First 3 periods: Price floor (6,000) 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
Last 4 periods: No price constraints
1 1.5 First 6 periods: Price floor (6,000) 7 sellers 7 buyers 8
Last 2 periods: No price constraints
2 2.1 Price floor (1312) 8 sellers 8 buyers 9
2 2.2 First 4 periods: price floor (1,470) 8 sellers 8 buyers 7
Last 3 periods: No price constraints
2 2.3 Price ceiling (1088) 8 sellers 8 buyers 10
2 2.4 Price ceiling (930) 7 sellers 7 buyers 10
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Table 2: Type 1 buyer’s valuation and Type 1 seller’s cost in Series 1
Type 1 buyer’s valuation
Quality
A B C D E F G H I J
Unit
1 5988 6680 7238 7674 8000 8228 8370 8438 8444 8400
2 5388 6080 6638 7074 7400 7628 7770 7838 7844 7800
3 4788 5480 6038 6474 6800 7028 7170 7238 7244 7200
4 4188 4880 5438 5874 6200 6428 6570 6638 6644 6600
5 3588 4280 4838 5274 5600 5828 5970 6038 6044 6000
6 2988 3680 4238 4674 5000 5228 5370 5438 5444 5400
7 2388 3080 3638 4074 4400 4628 4770 4838 4844 4800
8 1788 2480 3038 3474 3800 4028 4170 4238 4244 4200
9 1188 1880 2438 2874 3200 3428 3570 3638 3644 3600
10 588 1280 1838 2274 2600 2828 2970 3038 3044 3000
Type 1 seller’s cost
Quality
A B C D E F G H I J
Unit
1 3413 3690 4013 4377 4781 5220 5693 6195 6725 7278
2 3433 3710 4033 4397 4801 5240 5713 6215 6745 7298
3 3453 3730 4053 4417 4821 5260 5733 6235 6765 7318
4 3473 3750 4073 4437 4841 5280 5753 6255 6785 7338
5 3493 3770 4093 4457 4861 5300 5773 6275 6805 7358
6 3513 3790 4113 4477 4881 5320 5793 6295 6825 7378
7 3533 3810 4133 4497 4901 5340 5813 6315 6845 7398
8 3553 3830 4153 4517 4921 5360 5833 6335 6865 7418
9 3573 3850 4173 4537 4941 5380 5853 6355 6885 7438
10 3593 3870 4193 4557 4961 5400 5873 6375 6905 7458
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Table 3: Type 1 buyer’s valuation and Type 1 seller’s cost in Series 2
Type 1 buyer’s valuation
Quality
A B C
Unit
1 1555 2155 2355
2 1375 1975 2175
3 1195 1795 1995
4 1015 1615 1815
5 835 1435 1635
6 655 1255 1455
7 475 1075 1275
8 295 895 1055
9 115 715 915
9 -65 535 735
Type 1 seller’s cost
Quality
A B C
Unit
1 45 245 845
2 225 425 1025
3 405 605 1205
4 585 785 1385
5 765 965 1565
6 945 1145 1745
7 1125 1325 1925
8 1305 1505 2105
9 1485 1685 2285
10 1665 1865 2465
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Table 4: Efficiency and number of units traded by period for Series 1
Experiment 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
No No With With No With No
price price price price price price price
floor floor floor floor control floor control
Period
1 0.823 0.815 0.597 0.667 0.646
2 0.859 0.875 0.609 0.643 0.651
3 0.913 0.952 0.532 0.641 0.628
4 0.918 0.609 0.789 0.629
5 0.934 0.591 0.953 0.649
6 0.926 0.604 0.961 0.632
7 0.936 0.641 0.988 0.879
8 0.649 0.935
Mean efficiency 0.901 0.881 0.604 0.650 0.923 0.639 0.907
Efficiency
in a stable outcome 1.000 1.000 0.661 0.660 1.000 0.662 1.000
(Theoretical prediction)1
Average number of 43.1 44.3 27.8 32.3 43.3 31.5 36.5
units traded per period
Number of trades
in a stable outcome 44 39 28 32 44 28 39
(Theoretical prediction)1
1 The number of trades and efficiency in stable outcomes differ across sessions because the
number of sellers and buyers differ across sessions.
Table 5: Proportion of trade by quality during the second half periods in Series 1 (percent)
Experimental Treatments A B C D E F G H I J
No price floor 7.6 4.6 12.1 62.1 12.1 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
(Periods 5 -7, Experiment 1.1)
With price floor
(Periods 5 -8, Experiment 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 83.6 14.9 0.5 0.5
& Periods 5 -6, Experiment 1.5)
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Table 6: Coefficient estimates
β1 β2 β3 β4 γ n R
2
Series 1 264.9 -210.7 23.5 36.0 20 0.739
(44.8)1 (96.2) (43.0) (20.8)
Series 2 30.0 -51.0 6.7 19 0.625
(15.7) (16.3) (3.5)
Series 2 -16.3 -5.9 -8.3 17 0.671
(1.8) (4.1) (3.2)
1 Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7: Results when a price floor of 1312 was imposed.
Period Quality A Quality B Quality C Efficiency
Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume
1 1312.0 8 1332.5 19 1615.3 15 .711
(0.0) (46.7) (122.3)
2 – 0 1369.5 32 1605.5 10 .835
(105.7) (170.3)
3 – 0 1328.5 29 1485.0 10 .814
(54.2) (41.2)
4 – 0 1312.0 32 1357.9 16 .777
(0.0) (65.6)
5 – 0 1312.0 24 1433.4 16 .708
(0.0) (52.3)
6 – 0 1312.0 24 1449.4 17 .772
(0.0) (51.1)
7 – 0 1312.0 28 1465.0 14 .778
(0.0) (27.7)
8 1312.0 4 1312.0 20 1480.6 14 .736
(0.0) (0.0) (21.3)
9 – 0 1312.0 22 1496.1 19 .754
(0.0) (11.7)
Predicted – 0 1312 – 1612 – [.664, .984]
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Table 8: Results when a price floor of 1470 was imposed.
Period Quality A Quality B Quality C Efficiency
Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume
1 – 0 1470 2 1584.8 35 .711
(0.0) (28.9)
2 1470 1 1470 3 1584.8 33 .835
(0.0) (0.0) (21.3)
3 – 0 1470 1 1587.9 33 .814
(0.0) (4.9)
4 – 0 1470 2 1589.8 32 .777
(0.0) (4.5)
Predicted – 0 – 0 [1590, 1610] 34 .693
5 700.0 2 1181.0 39 1489.5 3 .942
(141.4) (90.0) (148.5)
6 700.0 1 1187.5 43 – 0 .991
(0.0) (8.5)
7 850.0 2 1193.6 42 – 0 .981
(240.4) (5.8)
Predicted – 0 [1190, 1210] 44 – 0 1
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Table 9: Results when a price ceiling of 1088 was imposed.
Period Quality A Quality B Quality C Efficiency
Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume
1 738.6 7 1019.2 37 1088.0 4 .861
(210.4) (68.5) (0.0)
2 793.9 7 1085.9 32 – 0 .922
(32.1) (6.0)
3 879.0 15 1088.0 29 – 0 .699
(77.1) (0.0)
4 925.9 29 1088.0 32 1088.0 4 .548
(60.0) (0.0) (0.0)
5 920.0 17 1088.0 24 – 0 .856
(36.2) (0.0)
6 910.3 13 1088.0 24 – 0 .851
(27.4) (0.0)
7 898.8 10 1088.0 28 – 0 .885
(6.9) (0.0)
8 876.6 10 1088.0 20 – 0 .873
(35.0) (0.0)
9 889.0 7 1088.0 22 – 0 .910
(0.0) (0.0)
10 879.5 8 1088.0 22 – 0 .882
(0.0) (0.0)
Predicted 888 – 1088 – – – [.664, .984]
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Table 10: Results when a price ceiling of 930 was imposed.
Period Quality A Quality B Quality C Efficiency
Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume Avg. Price Volume
1 790.7 20 930.0 16 – 0 .809
(77.2) (0.0)
2 798.8 25 930.0 6 – 0 .750
(41.1) (0.0)
3 794.4 31 – 0 – 0 .683
(36.1)
4 813.1 31 930.0 1 – 0 .608
(56.7) (0.0)
5 780.3 31 – 0 – 0 .677
(8.7)
6 781.9 31 – 0 – 0 .676
(20.1)
7 783.0 31 – 0 – 0 .677
(11.6)
8 789.7 34 – 0 – 0 .665
(12.9)
9 794.7 29 – 0 – 0 .657
(5.1)
10 795.8 31 930.0 1 – 0 .693
(4.1) (0.0)
Predicted [790, 810] 34 – 0 – 0 .635
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